


~~Secret~~ *Attachment*  
RECEIVED, DIRECTOR  
BUREAU OF  
INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH



JUNE 30, 1959

Dear Arleigh:

I appreciate your sending me ONI's thoughtful analysis of possible courses of action which may be pursued by the Soviet Union and Communist China in the present Berlin crisis. I shall, of course, bring it to the attention of appropriate people in the Department.

After a quick reading of the paper, my first reaction is to question the assumption that Khrushchev probably no longer wants a Summit conference. While it is true that Soviet behavior at Geneva indicates that Khrushchev is unwilling at this time to pay any significant price for a Summit, I do not think this necessarily means that he has decided that a Summit would be to his disadvantage and has therefore abandoned the idea. This, of course, is a question of judgment, and I do not pretend that my crystal ball is any clearer than yours.

With all good wishes, believe me,

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT MURPHY

Robert Murphy  
Deputy Under Secretary

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke,  
Chief of Naval Operations,  
Department of the Navy.

S/S - RO

A copy of this document is being furnished to the

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
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Authority *1000907436*  
By *SS* 8-24-91



CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS



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19 June 1959

Dear Bob:

Enclosed is an analysis prepared by my staff which has some aspects which may be interesting to you.

My own crystal ball isn't very clear these days, but the tricky Mr. Khrushchev just might pursue the devious paths portrayed.

Happy weekend to you, too.


Sincerely,

*Arleigh*

ARLEIGH BURKE

The Honorable  
Robert Murphy  
Under Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure



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
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

June 23, 1959

Mr. Long



LS

Analysis of Khrushchev's Intentions

Attached is a letter to Mr. Murphy from Adm. Arleigh Burke, dated June 19, enclosing an analysis of Khrushchev's intentions regarding a summit meeting.

EUR is requested to examine the analysis carefully and to prepare a memorandum to Mr. Murphy enclosing a suggested reply for his signature (salutation: "Dear Arleigh"; complimentary close: "With all good wishes, believe me,"). The reply need not be detailed unless EUR so recommends. The package should be cleared in INR, FE, and S/P and forwarded to S/S by 4:30 p.m. Monday, June 29.

*RM*  
Robert H. Miller  
S/S-RO  
Ext. 4154

Attachment:

Letter from Adm.  
Burke dated June 19.

cc: INR - Mr. Skiff  
S/P - Mr. Savage  
FE - Mr. Zurhellen

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deset with a national neurosis on the idea of a Summit Meeting to end world tensions, would probably still press the US, to no avail, to carry through with the Summit Meeting, thus causing a major rupture in UK/US solidarity. Khrushchev would thereby achieve every major advantage that a Summit Meeting could give him, and more:

a. Propaganda impact - "war mongering" Ike balks at Summit "earnestly" desired by peace-loving K. who "sincerely" seeks reduction of world tensions.

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INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS


Berlin Crisis

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
AN OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Subject: Sino/Soviet Intentions Related to Berlin Crisis

Encl: (1) Analysis of Possible Soviet-ChiCom Courses of  
Action in Berlin Crisis

1. Too many people in our government are assuming that Khrushchev really wants a Summit Conference and therefore will not initiate at this time any military actions that might scuttle one. On the contrary, there is good reason to believe that Khrushchev does not need a Summit Meeting to achieve the basic objectives he is shooting for in raising the Berlin issue and, in fact, does not want one. Enclosure (1) supports this reasoning.
2. Khrushchev can, and may, avoid a Summit by the direct tactic of torpedoing any substantial agreement among the Foreign Ministers at Geneva. This course of action, however, would place the onus of failure upon the USSR as well as upon the West. Therefore, he stands to gain a much greater propaganda advantage by choosing a more devious means of avoiding a Summit--a means which would cause the West, particularly the US, to back down on a Summit commitment, thus laying the entire blame for failure at the doorstep of the West. A veiled or indirect Sino/Soviet military venture, in an area removed from the Berlin issue, could well provide the ideal Summit "escape hatch" for Mr. Khrushchev.
3. Khrushchev probably reasons--and rightly so--that the President would balk at going to the Summit if prior Commie military operations were initiated in any part of the world. The British on the other hand, beset with a national neurosis on the idea of a Summit Meeting to end world tensions, would probably still press the US, to no avail, to carry through with the Summit Meeting, thus causing a major rupture in UK/US solidarity. Khrushchev would thereby achieve every major advantage that a Summit Meeting could give him, and more:
  - a. Propaganda impact - "war mongering" Ike balks at Summit "earnestly" desired by peace-loving K. who "sincerely" seeks reduction of world tensions.

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b. Issue splits US-UK.

c. "Failure of West" to meet with Soviets at Summit "forces" Khrushchev to turn over Berlin access controls to East Germany and strangulation of Berlin commences.

In short, Khrushchev gains more from not going to a Summit where, under the focus of world attention, he would undoubtedly have to make some concessions to appear reasonable.

4. Therefore, if the Soviets should soften their line at Geneva and meet the President's publicized minimum prerequisites in order to commit him to a Summit Meeting, we should be particularly alert for typical Commie treachery. It is quite conceivable that they would attempt to goad the President into backing out of a Summit commitment by their "pulling the plug" in an area detached from the Berlin issue. The present situation in Laos certainly lends itself admirably to this type of manipulation.

5. Another consideration in connection with the Summit issue is, of course, ChiCom intentions. They may very well take matters into their own hands to thwart any Summit at which they would not be represented. This could be accomplished by a unilateral Chinese adventure in Laos or by their reopening the Taiwan Straits crisis.

6. In summary, agreement at Geneva, if it comes, should not be taken as evidence of Soviet good faith. On the contrary, it should be an alarm signal for maximum alertness. We must be on our toes! The implications will be particularly significant for CINCPAC since his area is the most likely one to be involved in any possible military "side show."

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By *[Signature]* 8-24-91

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Analysis of Possible Soviet-ChiCom Courses of Action in Berlin Crisis

1. It is submitted that Khrushchev does not sincerely want a Summit unless he is reasonably certain that at such a meeting: (a) the West would actually, or in effect, accede to his terms; or (b) the West were to split over how much or how little of his terms to accept; or (c) major, relatively enduring political and propaganda advantages were clearly assured.
2. Khrushchev probably does not really expect a Summit meeting to take place.
3. Further, Khrushchev probably estimates he does not need a Summit to accomplish the only two things he would have any reason to hope such a meeting might give him--a basic Allied split, or a smashing propaganda victory. These two objectives can more feasibly be achieved, he probably estimates, by putting the Western powers in the position of quarreling over the strictly procedural issue of whether or not they should acquiesce to Soviet demands and go to a Summit.
4. That is to say, Khrushchev's highly publicized insistence on a Summit is a consummate bit of fakery. He is pressuring the Allies to attend a Summit he knows can not and will not be held unless, in the final analysis, the U.S. capitulates to the U.K. view re the need for and value of a Summit. He is insisting on a meeting at which, if indeed held and on a legitimate basis, he himself would almost certainly have to make concessions damaging to pursuit of his major objectives, both at home and abroad. He has boasted to the world that tensions can be relaxed only by Heads of State discussions with him. At a Summit, then, Khrushchev would have to "deliver" -- or else.
5. Khrushchev has three immediate broad lines of action: (a) to let the Geneva Conference collapse; lay blame on US/West Germany for failure to secure a Summit and for responsibility for continued world tensions; and proceed at once to mount pressure on Berlin by passing access controls to a "sovereign" East Germany; or (b) lay the blame, but to delay forcing the Berlin issue (till, perhaps, the US national election campaign one year hence); or (c) to make sufficient concessions at Geneva to meet the US requirement for "progress", thereby seemingly committing the President of the USA to attend a Summit. There is a good chance that

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Khrushchev will adopt the line of action (c) in expectation that subsequent developments will lead the US to recant on the Summit.

6. Khrushchev is fully aware of the UK "anxiety neurosis" over the possibility of hostilities over Berlin, and of the views expressed by highest UK officials that a Geneva failure would make a Summit even more mandatory. He probably estimates that these UK views on the importance of a Summit would be immeasurably intensified if agreement to hold one were actually secured at Geneva and subsequent events lead the US to change its mind. Khrushchev would undoubtedly hope that such a situation would split the Allies wide apart and with the onus squarely on the US.

7. Khrushchev might prevent consummation of an agreed Summit by initiating tough Soviet actions re Berlin. His capability for tension-building, stopping just short of committing the Soviets to hostilities over Berlin, is very great indeed. (The built-in "escape hatch" that a separate peace treaty and the "peaceful" management of access controls by East Germans provides, enables him to perform seemingly daring feats of "brinkmanship"). But such actions--if they were not already precluded by terms of the Summit-inducing concessions already made by Khrushchev--would place at least as much onus on the USSR as the US for collapse of the prospective Summit. The Soviets may also be somewhat reluctant to move ahead at this particular time with the creation of a separate East German state.

8. Accordingly, it is possible that, at this juncture, the ChiComs may enter on the scene by threatening to initiate military action in the Far East. Events in Laos have provided them with a pretext, and their propaganda has laid the groundwork for actual intervention. Such action could be interpreted as taken at Soviet behest, on the grounds that an independent threat in the SEATO area, involving three of the Western Big Four, would make the UK even more insistent that the agreed Summit meeting be held and the US more adamant against it. It would very likely mean British insistence on ChiCom participation at this Summit, and would increase UK pressure for a change in US China policy. The US/UK split would thus be very greatly widened. The Soviets would have given the ChiComs a big boost toward recognition as a major world power. The Soviet effort to shift the onus for wrecking the Summit would be facilitated. ChiCom threats against the Offshore Islands would, of course, serve the same general purpose.

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9. The Soviets might go so far as to have the ChiComs actually launch a closely-controlled military action in SEA, thus forcing SEATO to stand or fall. The UK and USSR, co-chairmen of the Geneva Agreements of 1954, might call for renewal of the ICC in Laos. The UK/US thus could well be at serious odds on several major points at once -- Germany, ICC, SEATO, and the Summit. This would be particularly apt to be true if, as in the Quemoy case, the Soviets attempted to forestall possible US military counteraction against the ChiComs by a statement that the US had forced the USSR to declare its military support for the ChiComs. That is to say, public pressure in the UK might be so strong as to cause the fall of the Macmillan government if it did not insist on and obtain a Summit. Meanwhile, US opposition to a Summit held under communist threats would preclude Khrushchev's having to worry about the presence of the ChiComs at such a forum.

A somewhat similar situation would obtain if ChiCom action were directed against the Offshore Islands.

10. The possibility of ChiCom military action can be considered from quite a different, though less likely, angle. There may in fact be no real coordination between Peiping and Moscow re Berlin and a Summit (Peng's recent trip notwithstanding), and possible ChiCom military moves might depend largely on the ChiComs own calculations respecting the Summit issue. A Summit would almost certainly discuss such basic matters as disarmament, test bans, inspection and control of nuclear production, surprise attack. All of these matters vitally affect the ChiComs who would not wish to have definitive agreements reached on same in their absence from the table. Accordingly, if the ChiComs felt a Summit were really in the offing, they might wish to sabotage it by undertaking an independent military thrust, thereby forcing a public statement of support from Khrushchev and ensuring a US refusal to attend a Summit under such threats.

11. In any event, the possibility of ChiCom military action in connection with Summit developments can not be overlooked.

